Autonomy and the OrtJwdoxy ofHuman Superiority

On the last page of the article Gaylin uses language to
indicate his view of the superiority of the human to the
nonhuman: "If the love and caring are supplied only
minimally, he [a human being] may survive as a biological
entity without the qualities of humanness that elevate him
above the common animal host. If at any key point an
individual is withdrawn from contact with his kind, he may
recreate social relationships in his imagination that sustain
him for a time, but he suffers the risk of being reduced to an
animal indistinguishable from lower forms"(p. 72, italics
mine). But there is no argument at all in the paper to the
effect that we alone are moral animals, and no argument for
the superiority of human to nonhuman animals. The focus
of the article is chiefly a discussion of the emotion of guilt.
What distinguishes the human from the nonhuman, however,
is instead the focus of the abstract, as is Gaylin's claim that
human beings are defined as the only moral animal. That
claim is relevant to the topic of this paper.
8 Gaylin,

Response:
Autonomy, Animals, and
Conceptions of The Good
R. G. Frey
Bowling Green State University
In a number of recent articles on animal issues, I I have
set out one view of the comparative value of human
and animal life. It is a view consonant both with my
earlier writings on animals 2 and with the emphasis upon
quality of life accounts of the value of life that are so
much a part of contemporary writing in medical ethics
and in applied ethics generally. Numerous details of
this quality of life view remain to be filled in, of course,
but its general outline, I think, is clear enough. Even in
general outline, however, some philosophers and others
have found the view wanting, if not in its entirety, then
certainly in some of its more prominent features. One
feature that has proved especially controversial is that
the value of some human lives can turn out to be of a
quality so low as to be exceeded in value by the lives of
some perfectly healthy animals, which in tum can have
implications for, say, which creatures are to be used in
medical experimentation. Another such feature, it would
appear, has been my remarks on the role of autonomy
in the value of human, as opposed to, animallives. 3
Bart Gruzalski's paper "Autonomy and The Myth of
Human Superiority" is very much in this latter vein. I
should like here briefly to respond to some of
Gruzalski's comments, before trying to bring more
sharply into focus certain features of the comparative
view of the value of human and animal life that I hold.
(In what follows, I leave aside Gruzalski's remarks on
other philosophers.)
In a way, it is odd that Gruzalski puts me in the
camp of those who espouse human "superiority." Most

"Feeling," op. cit., p. 72.

9 Immanuel Kant, Foundations of the Metaphysics of
Morals(NewYork: Bobbs-MerrillCompany, 1959): 414,p. 31.
10 Levertov,

op. cit.

11 R. G. Frey, 'The Significance ofAgency and Marginal
Cases," Philosophica 39 (1987), p. 40.

12 I may also be less satisfied when I reach the vista-if
my expectations are too high-precisely because of my
forward-looking approach. But that is the third problem with
Frey's argument, thatjudgmentalness (concomitant with high
expectations) diminishes the felt satisfactions even of
experiences that would have been perfectly satisfactory
otherwise.
13 Zen Flesh, Zen Bones (Garden City, New York: Anchor
Books, 1957), ed. by Paul Reps, p. 18.

14 Leo Tolstoy, The Death ofIvan Ilych (New York: New
American Library, 1960), pp. 147-148 and 152.

15 Although Ivan Ilych is a fictional character created by
Tolstoy, Tolstoy's characterization of one progression of
attitudes and insights through the dying experience has been
confirmed as both realistic and not uncommon by those who
work with the dying, according to conversations with Marion
Wilson Gruzalski, who has founded two hospices, developed
a third, and consulted for many more.

16 Derrick Jensen, Listening to the Land: Conversations
about Nature, Culture, and Eros (San Francisco: Sierra Club
Books, 1995), p. 6. Dave Forman is the founder of the activist
group Earth First! and, more recently, the Wilderness Project.

DISCUSSION

17 From "The Marriage of Heaven and Hell," in Bly, op.
cit., p. 41.
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often, over the comparative value of human and animal
life, I am found by medical experimenters and others
in the scientific community to be far too pro animal.
Concerning the value of life, far from asserting any
human superiority tout court, I have laid out in a large
number of papers 4 all kinds of situations in which the
value of an animal's life can exceed that of a human
life. To be sure, the human life in question may be an
unfortunate or tragic one, but that only makes the point,
which I stress repeatedly, that not all human lives have
the same value as normal adult human life. So any
thought that I afftrnl a blanket superiority of the value
of human over animal life is mistaken; indeed, it is
precisely because I know of nothing that to my mind
supports any such blanket claim that many feel I have,
at least in the area of experimentation, gone too far in
the animal direction. Certainly, my position is radically
different from that, say, of Carl Cohen, who, as best I
can tell, asserts rather confidently such a human
superiority.s
When I began developing my views on the
comparative value of human and animal lives, I was
aware that my choosing to use the word "autonomy" to
characterize the general phenomenon of choosing and
living out some conception of the good, of choosing a
kind of life for oneself and molding and shaping one's
day to day living in order to live out that life, could
prove confusing. It could encourage someone to think
that autonomy played a role in my conception of the
value of a life that it played, e.g., in Kant or other
deontological theorists. I thought my discussion of the
matter, especially my avowal that autonomy was only
an instrumental good, protected me from this confusion.
Apparently, however, this is not the case. Thus, in
what Gruzalski refers to as the "consensus view" of the
value of a life, which he maintains I share, it is claimed
that "human life, because of autonomy, is more valuable
than nonhuman life." Later, he characterizes the
consensus view as the claim that "our lives are more
valuable than the lives of nonhuman animals because
of a richness in our lives that derives from autonomy
and autonomy-based abilities..." (italics in original).
Still later, he speaks of the consensus view as claiming
that our lives are "more valuable than the lives of
nonhuman animals because we are autonomous...." I
do not believe these things, at least if the word "because"
in each case means what it usually means. For what all
of these claims do is to ascribe to autonomy an
importance and value that it does not have in my view.
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Rather, I hold the view that autonomy can be, and in
the case of normal adult humans usually is, the source
of additional value in a life, where that value is
determined by all the experiences, and by all the kinds
of experiences, that go to make up the life in question.
I shall return to this matter below.
So far as I am concerned, Gruzalski makes three
points. First, have goals, ends, desires, and a
conception of the good life and, because these can all
be frustrated, disappointment and/or suffering can
occur. Second, have a conception of the good life and
seek to mold and shape one's life according to it and,
because one can be overly preoccupied with planning
one's life, one can fail to live for tlle moment or to
live spontaneously and, so, fail to obtain those goods
that such living makes possible. Third, what Gruzalski
calls "judgmentalness"-the judgment that "things are
not good enough the way they are"-can undermine
the satisfaction that our present feelings, experiences,
and relationships would otherwise confer upon us.
In a way, these strike me as rather odd criticisms,
since they all amount to claims about what might
happen, in the absence of any explanation, particularly
any causal explanation, of why they will happen. Even
if all these things are possible, however, left in the very
general terms in which they are couched, it is not easy
to see what of any great significance ensues.
It is perfectly true that, if we rid ourselves of all
goals, ends, desires, and conceptions of the good life,
then we will not be disappointed through failing to
achieve or satisfy some of these. What exactly do we
make of this fact? Do we tell our children, "Do not
seek anything," "Strive for nothing," "Have no ambition
to make something of yourself'? Plainly, we do not:
striving, even with the added prospect of failure that it
opens up for us, is an important part, not only of what
we make of our lives, but also of their value; and though
disappointment often attends the failure fully to achieve
what we strive for, we counsel our children to stretch
themselves to the full. As it were, the journey, as much
as the arrival, enriches a life. That is why people often
say, even when they have failed, that the attempt was
nevertheless worth it.
Part of what may have gone wrong here is that
Gruzalski may have taken my notion of the richness of
a life as a way to refer, as it were, to the quantity of
experiences crammed into a life without regard to the
various kinds of experiences tlley are. One of tlle reasons
we want our children to stretch themselves to the full is
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that we know that there are all kinds or sorts of
experiences that life has to offer, and sampling them is
part of what we refer to when we say of someone that
s/he led a "rich, full" life. Such a statement does not
refer to a single dimension of experience, say, the
pleasure to be had from consuming desserts endlessly;
it refers to the multiple dimensions of the lives we
associate with normal adult humans. At times, Gruzalski
seems to write as if "felt satisfaction" meant pleasure;
but I am not a hedonist. I have all kinds of desires the
fulfillment of which involve me in all kinds of
experiences; I may feel pleasure as the result of desiresatisfaction, but there is no necessity in this and certainly
no identity between desire-satisfaction and pleasure.
Of course, the multi-dimensionality of normal adult
human lives means that the chances for desirefrustration are greater perhaps than if we had only a
single dimension to our lives, but even desire-frustration
does not lead most of us to look back and claim that
our Iives would have been more valuable still if we had
had only one kind of desire and if that kind of desire
was one we could easily satisfy. The richness of our
lives is not some mechanical adding together of our
pleasurable experiences, so that, if we could only stuff
ourselves with the desserts that we love, we should
achieve the richest, the supreme life of all. All of us
want lives for ourselves that contain more than desserts;
we want a full array of experiences over a broad range
of the sorts of activities that go to make up the lives of
normal adult humans.
The lives of nonnal adult humans contain all manner
of experiences that go to make up its content, where
the variety of kinds of experiences on offer for many of
us is precisely part of the attraction of trying to live a
full life. Birth, marriage, encounters, partings, divorce,
hate, love, jealousy, suspicion, battle, war, death: things
like this go to make up many of our lives and fonn
some of the benchmarks by which we in part try to
assess them, even though, at the time, hedonistically,
things looked rather bleak. What the person who eats
only desserts has missed is all the other various
dimensions in which normal adult humans can live their
lives, and when we pity those humans among us who
do not have normal adult human lives we in part do so,
not because we think, hedonistically, that their lives
contain less pleasure than ours, but because we know
that they will not be able to live lives the various
dimensions of which look anything like those present
in normal adult human lives. They will live human lives;
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they are, obviously, human. But they will not live human
lives anything like what such lives can be, when all the
various dimensions ofhuman life are taken into account;
and what they will be judged to be short on. is not
pleasurable experiences (they mayor may not be short
on these) but on all the kinds of experiences that can go
to make up human lives. In short, we have an idea of
what it is to live a rich, full life, of what it is to have a
life that develops and stretches our talents in ways which
indicate the full dimensions of what human life can be
like. Eating desserts comes nowhere near capturing
these dimensions. It seems an obvious truth that we
desire more things than pleasure, an obvious truth that
desire-satisfaction can be felt or experienced without
any accompanying pleasure, and an obvious truth that
pleasure comes nowhere near exhausting all of what
life has to offer. Pain and suffering often attend the
attempts to satisfy desires that stretch us in particular
ways, but where these desires form part of our
conception of the good, we rarely give up those desires
for that reason alone.
As for living spontaneously, how exactly are we to
interpret this injunction? There are neurosurgeons,
librarians, athletes, and pianists: how exactly are they
to live spontaneously? Does this injunction mean that
these individuals must not have professions in the first
place? But then how are they to live? And what kind of
society is Gruzalski envisaging for us, when professions
and otller ways of organizing our lives are put aside in
favor of spontaneous living? In fact, all Gruzalski's
point comes to is me caution mat we can become too
pre-occupied with an organized life and a job or
profession and so fail to capture in our lives many of
the otller good things mat life has to offer. But this
caution is already widely heeded: no one is a
schoolteacher or pilot twenty-four hours a day, and it is
easily possible in one's other time to experience all that
Gruzalski describes, from good meals and the
enjoyment of nature to reading the religious and quasireligious thinkers that Gruzalski quotes in his paper.
We all know this; that is why so many of us seek to
develop the various dimensions through which humans
can live their lives. We become cooks or athletes; we
read poetry and novels; we watch baseball games and
look at movies; we go for walks and camp in the
mountains; we go to PTA meetings and attend
neighborhood watch committees. The list is almost
endless of the sorts of activities and experiences that
we think make up the lives of normal adult humans,

10

Winter & Spring 1996

Frey: Response

find our life unsatisfactory. We look for those things
that we feel we are being shortchanged over. We may
have plenty of desserts and, so, pleasure in our lives,
yet still fmd life unsatisfactory; this is not all that bad a
thing, if it leads us to reflect that life has more to offer
than our present way of living realizes for us. Once
more, we do not judge one human life more successful
than another merely through adding up pleasurable
experiences and finding that one life contains 13 such
experiences and the other 12. If any hedonist/utilitarian
has ever thought this, it is because s/he has had, I think,
an impoverished value theory.
It should now be evident why Gruzalski's points
miss the thrust behind the claim that autonomy can be
used to augment the value of a life. That Uuust is not
one of inevitability or certainty that possession of
autonomy will inevitably or certainly enhance the value
of a life (still less is it that autonomy per se makes
human life more valuable than animal life). Rather, the
thrust is that autonomy can be used for that purpose.
In my view, autonomy is instrumentally, not
intrinsically, valuable. Its value depends upon the uses
made of it, and, in the case of normal adult humans,
those possible usages make all kinds of experiences
available. To direct one's own life to secure what one
wants, to make one's own choices as to spouse, job,
and other significant affairs of life, to assume
responsibility over a domain of one's life and so acquire
a certain sense of freedom to act, to decide how one
will live and to mold and shape one's life accordingly:
these are the sorts of things that open up areas of
enrichment in a life, with consequent effect upon that
life's quality and value. They are things which show us
living lives of multiple dimensions, which show whole
ranges of experiences open to us by our having chosen
to live this way as opposed to that. Equally, however, it
is possible that nothing of the sort will issue from the
exercise of one's autonomy; just because a life's value
can be augmented through the exercise of autonomy in
no way shows that it inevitably or always is so
augmented. But it would be a mistake to overlook
exactly what molding and shaping our lives in ways of
our own choosing opens up to us, in tenns of ranges of
experiences that become available to us, e.g., through
actually living the life of an athlete or pianist, and that
we subsequently so avidly pursue.
The point behind the above discussion, of course, is
to indicate ways in which the value of nonnal adult
human lives can be augmented, ways in which humans

including those who have professions. Of course, there
will be people who neglect this kind of development,
who are so single-minded in their pursuit of some end
that that end comes to absorb their lives and so to
squeeze out the pursuit of other ends. Far from regarding
such a person as exemplifying all that normal adult
human life can be, however, we actually regard such
people as having missed a huge number of the
dimensions ofnormal adult human life that can so enrich
it. Balance in our lives, balance, e.g., between our
professions and the other things that life has to offer,
is required, and most of us have to work at achieving
such balance, given how jobs and professions, with
their implications for financial livelihood, can come
to absorb us.
Moreover, I certainly reject the thought that animals
are more "natural" and so "superior" to us because they
do not require cognition or comparatively advanced
rationality in order to live the lives appropriate to their
species. There is nothing "unnatural" or "artificial"
about cognition, rationality, or conceptualizing
experience, and it is only a piece of romanticism, along
the lines of painting pre-civilized men as "noble"
savages or of suggesting that everything since the wheel
has been corruption or a part of the "rat race," to pretend
otherwise. The use of cognition, rationality, and
conceptualization in no way renders a life ignoble per
se, as one uses these further to enrich a life, even though
it is true that these same characteristics can be used in
morally wrong or dubious endeavors. For the fact of
the matter is, at least on my view, that there is no inherent
correlation between morality/immorality and a valuable
life; even immoral people, people who, e.g., use their
intellectual endowments to visit misery upon their
neighbors, can have valuable lives.
The '~udgmental" point that Gruzalski makes admits
of a reply similar to that given with respect to the
spontaneity charge. My pursuit of some conception of
the good may indeed lead me to become dissatisfied
with the way I am living my life at present and so may
result in my not getting out of my present way of living
all that it has to offer; but there is no necessity about
this, and we require some argument to indicate why we
should think any such failure to be inevitable. Even this,
I am inclined to say, gives more credence to the point
than it deserves; for, at least in some of the circumstances I have been describing thus far, being
dissatisfied with the way one is presently living
requires us to say in which dimensions of living we
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is not life but quality of life. The value of a life is a
function of its quality, its quality of its richness, and
its richness of its capacities and scope for enrichment.
It matters, then, what a creature's capacities for a rich
life are. The question is not whether a mouse's life
has value; I agree that it does. The mouse, just like a
man, has an unfolding series of experiences and can
suffer, and it is perfectly capable of living out a life
appropriate to its species. The question is about the life
appropriate to its species. The question is whether the
mouse's life approaches nonnal adult human life in
quality (and so value), given its capacities and what
these indicate about a life appropriate to its species,
and this is a matter of the comparative value of such
lives. It is on this basis, on the basis of greater richness
and greater potentialities for enrichment that the claim
that normal adult human life is more valuable than
animal life takes shape and is defended. Since not all
human lives have the same richness or potentiality for
enrichment, however, not all human lives are equally
valuable. In fact, some human lives can be so blighted,
with little or no prospect for enrichment, that the quality
of such lives can fall well below that of ordinary, healthy
animals. I take the case of anencephalic infants, the brain
dead, and those in tlle latter stages of senile dementia
to be cases in point.

can open up wider dimensions in which they can live
their lives, ways which are arguably deprived animals.
Il does not follow that animal life has no value
(precisely the opposite is my view) or that animal life
cannot have greater value than some human life (again,
precisely the opposite is my view). Rather, what is
centrally at issue is the comparative value of normal
adult human life and animal life and how we are to go
about deciding the matter.
On this issue of comparative value, Gruzalski is also
unhelpful. Certainly, if we adopt some Eastern religion
or some form of quasi-religious metaphysic or some
"New Age" mantra, it is very possible that we might
come to have a different view of animals and of how
we stand to them. Indeed, we might come to take a
different view of our relations to the animal kingdom
(and the inanimate environment as well) without any
specific religious impulses at all. This much is clear to
all of us, through poetry, through cultural differences
we encounter amongst the individuals who make up
our society, and through exposure to the art of different
ages and cultures. From these different, possible views
of our relations to animals different, possible accounts
of the comparative value of human and animal life may
flow. Again, this much seems clear. But from the mere
fact that there are different, possible accounts of tllis
comparative value nothing follows per se about the
adequacy of any single one. Argument must establish
the soundness of such accounts, and if, e.g., one's claims
about comparative value turn upon one's adoption of
an Eastern religion or some religious or "New Age"
metaphysic, then it is that religion or metaphysic that
must be subjected to scrutiny. Merely to be able, within
the fabric of that religion or metaphysic, to tell stories
tlle purport of which is to have us believe all manner of
things of animals and the value of their lives is not the
kind of scrutiny of a view or metaphysic that is required.
My own account of how we are to decide the
comparative value of human and animal life must
equally be subject to scrutiny; that is, at the very least,
I must have something to say, in addition to trying to
assess the comparative value of these lives, for going
about assessing it in the way I do. I have a number of
reasons in this regard, but I have space here for only a
few words on one of them.
One of the strengths of my position on the value of
human and animal life, I believe, is that it coheres
nicely with recent discussions of the value of life in
medical ethics and allied areas: in a word, what matters
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Plainly, then, the animal case receives no different
treatment from the human case: both turn upon quality
of life views and accounts of the richness and the scope
for enrichment of the lives in question. Such a view
of the value of life is not speciesist in any first-order
sense (nor, as we shall see, in a second-order sense),
wherein value questions are decided upon the basis of
species membership.
Quality of life views of the sort described turn upon
richness, and if we are to answer the question of the
comparative value of human and animal life, we must
inquire after the richness of their respective lives.
Intra-species comparisons are sometimes difficult, as
we learn in medical ethics, when we try to judge the
respective quality of life of each of two human lives,
but such comparisons are not completely beyond us.
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not to be determined by richness, that is, by the extent,
variety, depth, and quality of experiences, I do not know
what else is to determine it.
Why cannot we say that the mouse and the man have
different capacities and lives, so that, judged by their
respective capacities, each leads a rich, full though
different life? The problem here has a deeper aspect:
one seems to be saying that these lives, and so the
ingredients that make up these lives, are in some sense
incommensurable, when, in fact, the central ingredients,
namely, experiences and the unfolding of experiences
in a life, appear remarkably alike. Can I know what it's
like to be a dog? To a more or less extent. That is why
I think playing with a dog enriches its life. Can I know
exactly how much it enriches its life? No, just as I
sometimes cannot know the degree of enrichment in
the case of humans. But I have no reason whatever to
believe that the dog's life possesses anything like the
variety and depth of ways of enrichment that my life
possesses, and I need evidence to make me believe that
enrichment of the dog's life through any single one of
its capacities could make up for this extent and variety
in my case. To be sure, the eagle can see further and
deeper that I can, but how does this fact transform the
richness of its life to approximate the richness that all
the variety and depth of my capacities confers upon
me? I need evidence to believe that it does.
I doubt, then, that there are incommensurabilities
present here, so that I am not thereby in principle denied
access to the animal case. In the end, I believe that this
is the most important point to establish, in order to
pursue and to have any hope of resolving the
comparative value questions; for this point would in
tum tend to support the view that the difficulties in fully
assessing the quality of life of at least the "higher"
animals are ones of degree, not of kind.
With a quality of life view of the value of a life that
takes the above form, it will not be true that all human
lives are equally valuable, whatever tlleir richness or
scope for enrichment. I reject the so-called argument
from "marginal cases" (tragic human cases) then,
because the point about differing degrees of richness
and scope for enrichment settles the question of whether
human lives can have differing qualities and, so, values.
One cannot use this argument over unfortunate humans,
therefore, to try to squeeze in a claim for equal quality
and value for animal lives.
Let me stress, then, that on a quality of life view of
the value of a life of the sort sketched, the human and

They are made every day in our hospitals, in order, e.g.,
to allocate resources, etc. Inter-species comparisons of
richness and quality of life are likely to be even more
difficult, though again not impossible. Certainly, as we
descend from the "higher" animals, we are likely to
lose all behavioral correlates that we use to gain access
to the interior lives of animals. Yet, more and more
scientific work constantly appears that gives us a
glimpse into animal lives, whether in captivity or in
the wild. So, exactly how much we can know of the
inner experiences of animals, of their subjective lives
matters to our judgment of the value of their lives,
just as it does in our case.
In our attempt to grasp the subjective experiences
of animals, we must not use in some unreflective manner
criteria appropriate for assessing the richness of human
lives as if they applied straightforwardly to the animal
case. I am not a speciesist in this second-order sense
either. Rather, much as ethologists and animal
behaviorists do, we must use all that we know about
animals, especially those closest to us, in order to try to
gauge the quality of their lives in terms appropriate to
their species. Then, we must try to understand to what
we allude when we speak of rich, full lives for mice
and men. The fullest mouse life there has ever been, so
science would seem at the moment to suggest, does not
approach the full life of a human; the difference in
capacities, and what these additional capacities make
possible by way of further dimensions to human
existence, is just too great. So, if one nevertheless wants
to maintain that the mouse's life is as valuable as the
life of a normal adult human, then it must be that,
whatever the capacities of the mouse and however
limited those capacities may be in depth and extent,
they confer a richness upon the mouse's life that
approximates the richness of the human's life, with all
its different and additional capacities, and the ranges
of experiences these make possible, in the typical human
case. Evidence is needed to support this claim, since
we will not ordinarily think this of tlle mouse by its
behavior alone.
If we are to work with a quality of life view of the
value of a life, both human and animal, then we must
try imaginatively to place ourselves in the mouse's
position, with the capacities and life of the mouse.
Difficult, yes, but not impossible.
One might try to block my judgment of reduced
richness in the animal case by dropping the provision
that quality of life is determined by richness. But if it is
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animal cases are seen as remarkably alike in the role
that experiences and experiences unfolding in a life play.
What the animal case has to contend with, so far as
normal adult humans are concerned, is the extent,
variety, quality, and depth of experiences that are
available to humans through the multiple dimensions
of our lives, some of which are made available to us
through the exercise of our autonomy. Nothing in all
this says that human lives are more valuable than animal
lives because they are autonomous lives; all autonomy
does, at best, is to make ranges of experiences available
to humans. Even without autonomy, animal lives are
valuable, since animals remain experiential creatures,
but without autonomy, human lives are not as valuable
as they can be, since the full range of the experiences
such lives are capable of through the additional
capacities that normal adult human lives typically
possess is not present.

Reply:
The Instrumental Value
of Autonomy
Bart Gruzalski
Pacific Center for Sustainable Living
The best-laid schemes 0' mice an' men
Gang aft aglay,
An' lea'e us naught but grief an' pain,
For promised joy!"

Robert Burns}
Philosophers have cited autonomy as the reason for
thinking that the lives ofnonnal adult humans are more
valuable than the lives of nonhuman animals. In
"Autonomy and the Orthodoxy of Human Superiority"
(hereafter, "Orthodoxy"), I questioned what value
autonomy adds to a life: are our lives better off because
we are autonomous and therefore have the ability to
pursue what we think of as the "good life"? If we take an
external perspective, the answer is plausibly negative:
because of our pursuits of what we think is a "good life,"
we have committed genocide, created nuclear weapons,
caused numerous extinctions, and wrecked havoc on the
earth's ecosystem. But if we take an inner perspective, it
seems plausible that an ability to choose our own idea of
the good life and mold our life to accommodate that idea
adds positive value to that life.
This value might be added in one of two ways. It
could be that our lives are inherently more valuable
because of these capacities or that our lives are more
valuable because of the instrumental value of these
capacities. R. G. Frey holds the instrumental position,
claiming that the exercise of autonomy enriches a life,
causing "considerable satisfaction." In investigating
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